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A WORLD OF DISTRUST
Timothy M. Mulvaney*
In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court determined
that a prudent officer had probable cause to arrest attendees at a festive
house party for criminal trespass without a warrant. While reactions from
scholars of criminal law have begun to emerge, this Piece is the ﬁrst to
conceive of the decision through the lens of property theory. In this regard,
the Piece offers two principal claims. First, on interpretive grounds, it
contends that, in constitutionalizing these arrests based on evidence
seemingly unrelated to whether the party attendees knew or should have
known they were trespassing, Wesby generated a de facto reallocation of
property interests. Speciﬁcally, the decision abolished (a) the right held by
the general public to access without fear of arrest those properties to which
they reasonably believe they are welcome and (b) the correlative duty of
titleholders to respect reasonably mistaken access until the mistake is
revealed. Second, on normative grounds, it questions the justiﬁcatory
nature of this shift from an allocation that vindicates the trust one person
has placed in another to an allocation that allows someone else to violate
that trust. The Piece concludes that perceiving Wesby as a dispute over
property interests will not only deepen the developing assessments of the
decision by scholars of criminal law but more broadly prompt reﬂection
on matters across the property spectrum as to the oft-concealed
implications that allocative choices regarding property interests bring to
bear on our ability to trust one another in the marketplace and in myriad
social settings.

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Texas A&M University
School of Law. Thank you to Vanessa Casado Pérez, Hanoch Dagan, Eric Freyfogle, Nadav
Shoked, and Joseph Singer for reviewing earlier drafts of this Piece and to Gregory
Alexander, Peter Byrne, Nestor Davidson, John Lovett, Thomas Mitchell, Sarah Nield,
Lorna Fox O’Mahony, Kenneth Reid, Richard Shay, Elsabe van der Sijde, and Laura
Underkuffler for insightful conversations on the Piece’s theme. I beneﬁted from the
opportunity to present various iterations and components of this project at Harvard Law
School, Maastricht University, the University of Cambridge, the University of Edinburgh,
and the University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful for the ﬁne research assistance of
Ian Klein.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to a neighbor’s noise complaint, six police officers arrived
at a house party in our nation’s capital.1 Some of the twenty-one attendees
asserted that a woman whom they believed to be a tenant had invited them,
while others said they were invited by someone else.2 The host admitted to
the police that she had extended the invitations and encouraged others to
do the same.3 She also confessed, however, that while she had been negotiating with the titleholder, the two had—allegedly unbeknownst to the
attendees—not yet ﬁnalized a lease.4 Upon learning that the host was not
actually a tenant and that the titleholder had not authorized the party, the
police immediately arrested the attendees for criminal trespass and
transported them to a local police station.5
In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court considered whether
a reasonably prudent officer in these circumstances had probable cause to
make such warrantless arrests.6 In holding that such an officer could have
inferred that the attendees knew or should have known that they were
trespassing, the Court pointed only to the following categories of evidence:
the condition of the interior of the house; the attendees’ conduct at the
party, which was legal if, to some, immoral; the attendees’ reactions to the
officers; and the second-hand nature of some of the party invitations.7
Reactions to the decision from criminal law and procedure scholars—
some consisting of praise and others critique—are beginning to emerge.8
1. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S.
Ct. 577 (2018).
2. Id. at 17.
3. Id. at 18.
4. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Pillard, J. &
Edwards, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he owner told the officers
he had not yet rented the house to [the host].”).
5. Wesby, 765 F.3d at 18. Under District of Columbia law, the crime of unlawful entry
on property carries with it a possible jail sentence of up to 180 days and a ﬁne of up to
$1,000. D.C. Code § 22-3302 (2020).
6. See 138 S. Ct. at 585–89.
7. See id. at 586–87.
8. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Albrecht, Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity
“From Below”, 53 Val. U. L. Rev. 47, 59 (2018) (suggesting that Wesby converts the “probable
cause” standard to an “arguable probable cause” standard, thereby “further unmoor[ing]”
the doctrine of qualiﬁed immunity “from its original purpose of granting immunity only
in qualiﬁed circumstances” (emphasis omitted)); Karen M. Blum, Qualiﬁed Immunity: Time
to Change the Message, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1887, 1928 n.262 (2018) (contending that
Wesby contributes to a line of qualiﬁed immunity jurisprudence that effectively eliminates
myriad civil rights claims); Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualiﬁed Immunity and Constitutional
Structure, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1405, 1414 & n.57 (2019) (citing Wesby as one of the Supreme
Court’s cases that offers questionably broad deference to the police under the doctrine of
qualiﬁed immunity); Anthony J. Ghiotto, Traffic Stop Federalism: Protecting North
Carolina Black Drivers from the United States Supreme Court, 48 U. Balt. L. Rev. 323, 352
& n.230 (2019) (citing Wesby as supportive of a “traffic stop framework” that generates racial
disparities); Kit Kinports, The Quantum of Suspicion Needed for an Exigent Circumstances
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This Piece, however, is the ﬁrst to supplement this burgeoning literature
with an assessment of Wesby through the lens of property theory.
The Piece presents two original claims in this regard. First, on interpretive grounds, Part I contends that Wesby generated a de facto reallocation of
property interests. This suggestion is, as a threshold institutional matter,
quite jarring, for probable cause jurisprudence has long been tethered to
the underlying criminal offenses for which the elements are generally determined by state law. It seems highly unlikely that the Court sought to create
a pseudofederal common law rule of criminal trespass that would become
the basis of constitutional analysis under the Fourth Amendment; more
likely, the Court, in its zeal to protect the police, paid little care to the state
property law defining the suspected crime for which the arrests were made
here. Regardless of the Court’s background aims, the decision—to draw on
the terminological framework coined by Wesley Hohfeld9—effectively abolished (a) the right held by the general public in the District of Columbia
Search, 52 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 615, 626 & n.57 (2019) (suggesting that Wesby contributes
to the confusion surrounding the distinction between ﬁndings of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualiﬁed Immunity, 93 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1797, 1836 (2018) (suggesting that any hopes of the Court reassessing its
qualiﬁed immunity jurisprudence were dashed in Wesby); Paul David Stern, Tort Justice
Reform, 52 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 649, 675 (2019) (describing how Wesby offers questionably
broad deference to the police under the qualiﬁed immunity doctrine, thereby leaving
victims without a tort remedy); Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and
Routine Traffic Stops, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 706 (2019) (lauding Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence in Wesby for questioning “whether [the] Court, in assessing probable cause,
should continue to ignore why police in fact acted” in qualiﬁed immunity cases); Marcus R.
Nemeth, Note, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of Qualified
Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 989, 1020 & n.211
(2019) (querying Justice Thomas’s finding of qualified immunity in Wesby after his having
critiqued qualified immunity jurisprudence in a separate case just one year prior as embodying
“precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the
power to make” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring))); see also Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Supreme
Court Rules for Police Officers in D.C. House Party Case that Involved Mystery Hostess Called
‘Peaches’, Wash. Post (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
supreme-court-rules-for-police-officers-in-dc-house-party-case-that-involved-mystery-hostess-called
-peaches/2018/01/22/87e5eb4a-fed3-11e7-bb03-722769454f82_story.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting the D.C. Attorney General as remarking that “[Wesby] is an
important ruling that means that police officers can continue to carry out their vital duty to
protect public safety”); Rebecca M. Lightle, SCV: Totality of Circumstances Justified Vehicle
Search, Va. Law. Wkly. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://valawyersweekly.com/2018/08/03/totality-of
-circumstances-justified-vehicle-search (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the
futility of a plaintiff’s argument in challenging a search of his vehicle given Wesby’s rejection
of an “attempt at a ‘divide and conquer analysis’ of the facts in . . . supporting the probable
cause determination”).
9. In a pair of highly inﬂuential articles published over a century ago, Wesley Hohfeld
developed an analytical framework for understanding interests in property as relational
pairs. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913). Under this
framework, if one individual holds a speciﬁc entitlement (a right, privilege, power, or
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(and, by logical extension, other jurisdictions with a comparable criminal
trespass ordinance) to access without fear of arrest those properties to which
they reasonably believe they are welcome and (b) the correlative duty of
titleholders (and, in turn, the police) to respect reasonably mistaken access
until the mistake is revealed. It replaced this right–duty pairing with a
strengthened general right of titleholders to exclude others and the
correlative duty of the public to avoid making even reasonable mistakes as
to whether their invited entry onto another’s property actually is warranted.
Second, on normative grounds, Part II calls into question the justiﬁcatory nature of the shift from a property allocation that vindicates trust one
person has placed in another to an allocation that allows someone else to
violate that trust. In the world of distrust that Wesby creates, recipients of
invitations are tasked with formally conﬁrming their host’s occupancy
rights, accepting invitations without such conﬁrmation at the risk of arrest,
or denying those invitations outright. The consequences of a person’s selecting any one of these options—respectively, breeding distrust, preying
on vulnerabilities, and fostering social isolation—are disquieting, and the
economic, privacy, personal responsibility, and pragmatic rationales offered for allowing them to persist ultimately wither under scrutiny.
The Piece concludes that perceiving Wesby as a property case not only
will deepen the developing assessments of the decision by scholars of criminal law, but, more broadly, prompt reﬂection on matters across the property spectrum as to the oft-concealed implications that allocative choices
bring to bear on our ability to trust one another in the marketplace and in
myriad social settings.
I. REALLOCATING PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property law consists of state allocative choices made in the face of
competing claims to access or exclude others from ﬁnite resources, such
as land, water, or minerals.10 These choices establish the contours of con-

immunity), then the other person involved in that relationship holds the opposite of that
entitlement (correlatively, a duty, no-right, liability, or disability). For a sample application,
consider the well-known dispute in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which a residential
construction company sought to drive across Jacque’s barren ﬁeld to deliver a mobile home
to Jacque’s neighbor. See 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). The court found that Jacque
held the right to exclude Steenberg Homes from accessing Jacque’s ﬁeld, such that
Steenberg Homes had a correlative duty not to interfere with Jacque’s exclusionary right
(and whereby Jacque could ﬁle a lawsuit to enforce that right upon Steenberg Homes
should the company breach that duty). See id. at 159–60. A pilot may, however, have the
privilege of accessing Jacque’s airspace above a certain altitude, in which case Jacque would
have no right to enforce against the pilot.
10. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 145, 169
(2018) (“If the state allocates to one party a right to control the use of land or to mine
subsurface resources, it denies that right and those attendant to it to all others.”); Timothy
M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 911, 928–29 (outlining how property law
is understood as a choice made by the state in allocating resources).
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temporarily legitimate social and market relationships. In turn, they necessarily determine which of those relationships are considered subprime and,
in select instances, even rise to the level of criminality. The ﬁrst section
below explains that, long before the house party at issue in Wesby, the
District of Columbia required the state to prove that entrants knew or reasonably should have known that all lawful occupants opposed their entry
in order to yield convictions. The second section concedes that the Court’s
conclusion that the arrests here did not violate the party attendees’ Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unwarranted seizure absent probable cause
does not technically upset this allocative choice.11 By deeming relevant to
the attendees’ reasonability determination only novel types of evidence
that will signiﬁcantly alter how individuals relate to one another, however,
the decision amounts to a de facto reallocation of property rights.
A.

The District of Columbia’s Allocative Choice

Decades prior to the arrests at issue in Wesby, the District of Columbia—
upon deciding to criminalize trespass—faced the option of either (a) allocating to lawful occupants the liberty to call on the police to arrest all unwanted entrants, or (b) allocating to entrants security from criminal liability if they do not bear a certain state of mind. It logically follows that a
decision as to whether police officers’ arrest of the party attendees here
for criminally trespassing violated the attendees’ Fourth Amendment right
to be free of unwarranted seizure absent probable cause necessarily must
be tied to the District’s prior, underlying choice among these options.12
The District’s criminal trespass ordinance states, in relevant part, that
“any person who, without lawful authority, shall enter . . . any . . . property,
against the will of the lawful occupant . . . shall be deemed guilty.”13 The
ordinance, therefore, is not explicit as to the requisite mens rea. In a series
of decisions beginning in the 1960s, however, the District’s appellate
courts set out what one panel recently described in Ortberg v. United States
as the jurisdiction’s longstanding “discernible” interpretation of the
ordinance.14

11. An arrest is considered a “seizure” of a person, and thus triggers the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
12. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586. The Court also held that, even if it had decided that the
officers did not have probable cause, the officers reasonably believed that they had probable
cause and thus were protected from individual liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Id. at 591. For more on qualified immunity, see infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
13. D.C. Code § 22-3302 (2020). The District has adjusted the language of its criminal
trespass ordinance on two occasions since the arrests at issue in Wesby, though neither set of
adjustments is material for purposes of the theses advanced here. See Omnibus Public Safety
and Justice Amendment Act of 2009, 56 D.C. Reg. 7413 (Sept. 11, 2009); Criminal Fine
Proportionality Amendment Act of 2012, 60 D.C. Reg. 2064 (Jan. 23, 2013); Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. at 583 (giving the date of the party as March 16, 2008).
14. 81 A.3d 303, 308 (D.C. 2013).
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In Ortberg, the defendant, Adam Ortberg, entered an invitation-only
fundraiser in a hotel ballroom for the purpose of protesting a congressional
member’s political stances.15 Mr. Ortberg contended that the District’s criminal trespass ordinance required that the state prove that an entrant “knowingly or deliberately defied the wishes” of the lawful occupants.16 He claimed
that the state failed to meet its burden in this case given that, at least in his
own mind, the ballroom was not distinctly closed off to members of the
public walking about the hotel’s lobby.17 A District appellate panel rejected
Mr. Ortberg’s narrow interpretation of the criminal trespass ordinance’s
requisite mens rea; at the same time, however, the court noted that the
legislature had not “signaled its intent to impose strict liability.”18 Instead,
said the court, the District long ago had struck a middle ground: To obtain
a conviction, the state must prove that the defendant “‘knew or should have
known’ that his entry was unwanted” by all lawful occupants.19
On this standard, the lawful occupants’ opposition to the entry need
not be subjectively understood by the entrant, but instead may be “objectively manifest through either express or implied means.”20 Pre-Ortberg
decisions had found such an objective manifestation explicit where the entry
contravened “a prominently posted warning”21 or a “sign and . . . public
announcement”22 and implicit where “at least some of the windows” of a
home were “boarded over”23 or a construction site was encircled by barbedwire fencing and locked gates.24 Where the lawful occupants’ opposition to
the entry is not subjectively understood by the entrant and such objective

15. Id. at 305.
16. Id. at 306.
17. See id. at 305–06.
18. Id. at 307. Missouri is the only state that explicitly designates criminal trespass as a
strict liability offense. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 569.150 (West 2017) (“A person commits trespass
in the second degree if he or she enters unlawfully upon real property of another. This is
an offense of absolute liability.”). Several other state statutes, like the District ordinance at
issue in Wesby, do not identify a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.320,
11.46.330 (2019); Idaho Code § 18-7008 (2019); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 (West
2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-159.12, 14-159.13 (2019); Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.245 (2019); Tex.
Penal Code § 30.05 (2019); Va. Code § 18.2-119 (2019). It is conceivable that courts in those
jurisdictions could interpret those statutes as imposing strict liability. A Virginia court,
though, decided against such an interpretation. See Reed v. Commonwealth, 366 S.E.2d
274, 278 (Va. 1988) (“As a penal statute, . . . the Virginia criminal trespass statute has been
uniformly construed to require a willful trespass.”).
19. Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 305 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 308.
21. Artisst v. United States, 554 A.2d 327, 330 (D.C. 1989).
22. Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1965).
23. Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. 1985).
24. Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1971); see also McGloin v. United
States, 232 A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. 1967) (noting that “no one would contend that one may lawfully
enter a private dwelling house simply because there is no sign or warning forbidding entry”
(emphasis added)).
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manifestations are absent, the entry is considered presumptively permitted
on the theory that the lawful occupant has implicitly consented to it.25
The property allocation Ortberg describes can be explained in the following Hohfeldian terms: Persons who reasonably—though mistakenly—
trust, through interactions with others, that they are authorized to enter
land titled in someone other than themselves “own” a right of temporary
access to that land, which immunizes them from criminal prosecution so
long as they withdraw as soon as their mistake is revealed.26 In turn, the
titleholder owns the power to call on the police to seek the arrest and jailing of any entrant except in instances of an entrant’s reasonable mistake.
At bottom, then, the ordinance allocates to all individuals the liberty to
enter premises of another during the period that they do not know and
should not reasonably be aware that all lawful occupants of those premises
oppose the entry, and allocates to lawful occupants security against entry
by the billions of individuals who know or should know that their entry is
universally unwanted.
Of course, persons of interest to the police often, at least initially, present innocent accounts of suspicious behavior.27 With this in mind, the
Supreme Court long has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require
“only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity,” to support an arrest.28 On this standard, mere
circumstantial evidence that controverts an innocent account is sufficient
to support a probable cause ﬁnding;29 it need not even be preponderant

25. On implicit consent, see infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
26. On Hohfeld’s framework, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Other jurisdictions apparently provide greater protections to entrants than does the District’s law. For
instance, in some jurisdictions with statutes requiring that the state prove that entrants had
knowledge that they were making an unwanted intrusion, courts have explicitly conﬁrmed
that mere proof that entrants should have known that their entry was unwarranted is insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea. See, e.g., State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 689 (Me.
1987); State v. Santiago, 527 A.2d 963, 965 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Commonwealth
v. Sherlock, 473 A.2d 629, 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36, 38 (Vt. 1995).
27. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Rarely
will a suspect fail to proffer an innocent explanation for his suspicious behavior.”).
28. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 243–44 & n.13 (1983)).
29. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that police
officers were not required to accept defendant’s proffered innocent explanation of events on
faith alone but were rather entitled to weigh it against other potentially inculpatory facts).
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of guilt.30 However, while this requirement “is not a high bar,”31 the “facts
and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information”32 must be “sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an offense” as deﬁned
by the applicable state law.33
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that assessing whether probable cause exists in a particular situation involves comparing (a) the “reasonably trustworthy information” available to the arresting officers with
(b) the elements of the alleged offense.34 Therefore, on the Wesby facts, a
prudent officer in the responding officers’ shoes presumably must have
had some evidence—not necessarily evidence of a weight and quality
sufficient to garner a conviction, but some “reasonably trustworthy” evidence—that the attendees that officer chose to arrest for criminal trespassing possessed the state of mind required by the District’s criminal trespass
law, i.e., that these attendees knew or should have known that their entry was
unwanted by all lawful occupants.35 As the following section sets out, how-

30. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2013) (noting that “[f]inely tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence .
. . have no place in the . . . decision” on whether officers had probable cause (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235)); Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“[T]he
term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . .
It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)));
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (asserting that probable cause “does not require
the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to
support a conviction”).
31. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014));
see also Maren J. Messing, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Reaffirming a Limited Exception,
44 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 33, 64 (2010) (“[P]robable cause is equated with some amount
of evidence . . . .”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 255, 259
(2015) (“Police arrests require only probable cause—a very small amount of evidence.”).
32. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
33. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
34. See Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 401, 410–11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating
that the arresting police officers needed to reasonably believe that “the protestors knew no
permit was granted” in order to arrest them); Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595,
602 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Whether any particular set of facts suggest that an arrest is justiﬁed by
probable cause requires an examination of the elements of the crime at issue.”); United
States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that mere possession of a
knife does not constitute an unlawful action without the possessor’s intent to use that knife
in an unlawful manner).
35. The Wesby Court could have been far clearer in identifying the state law
underpinning its decision on probable cause. The lone paragraph explicitly discussing the
District’s criminal trespass law comes in the form of a critique of the lower court for relying
on a single decision—Smith v. United States—to conclude that the “knew or should have
known” standard is “settled law.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591 (citing Smith v. United States, 281
A.2d 438, 439–40 (D.C. 1971)). While the lower court could have cited to additional
decisions eliciting this standard (as noted above, Ortberg surveys a litany of precedents in
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ever, the considerations that the Wesby Court deemed relevant to an entrant’s state of mind suggest that, for all practical purposes, the Supreme
Court’s decision effectively served to alter the District’s initial allocative
choice by regarding even reasonably mistaken entrants as strictly liable.
B.

Wesby’s De Facto Reallocation

The party host, to whom the record refers only as “Peaches,” ultimately confessed that she did not have authority to extend invitations to
the house party.36 However, as all litigants conceded, there was no evidence
in the record indicating that she shared this information with any of the
attendees before the police arrived.37 Indeed, common sense suggests that
if Peaches actually wanted anyone to attend this party, she would have refrained from mentioning to her invitees that she and—thus, they—were
not actually authorized to enter the house. Drawing on other evidence,
though, the Wesby Court held that a rational officer in these circumstances
could have made the “entirely reasonable inference”38 that the attendees
were “knowingly taking advantage of a vacant house as a venue for their
late-night party.”39
In holding that a reasonable officer could have inferred that the
attendees knew or should have known that they were trespassing, the
Court pointed to three categories of evidence: the condition of the interior of the house, the attendees’ conduct at the party, and the attendees’
this regard), that it did not do so does not make its conclusion on the operative mens rea
requirement erroneous. Indeed, Smith seems a sufficient citation to support an explanation of
the circumstances in which the District wanted there to be criminal punishment for the ordinarily civil offense of trespass. In Smith, a company that held title to the relevant parcel of
land manifested its opposition to the entrant’s access to that parcel by “post[ing] signs
indicating . . . rightful control of the site.” Smith, 281 A.2d at 440. The Smith court deemed
the company’s explicit act unambiguous, and therefore concluded that the entrant was not
entitled to a jury instruction explaining that reasonable mistake is a defense to a criminal trespass charge. Id. at 439–40. Smith noted, though, that such an instruction would be warranted
when an entrant’s “bona ﬁde belief” is grounded in “some reasonable basis.” Id. at 439. In
this regard, Wesby sits alongside other recent Fourth Amendment decisions by the Supreme
Court that rest on what are, at best, underdeveloped depictions of the underlying state
property laws. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (assuming that, under
Maryland law, touching the chattel of another without causing damage constitutes a trespass); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006) (assuming that, under Georgia law,
one lawful resident of a home can preclude another lawful resident from welcoming law
enforcement officers into the home).
36. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583–84. As for Peaches’s given name, news reports identiﬁed
her as Veronica Little, a woman who, friends said, earned her nickname as a result of her
Georgian roots. See, e.g., Barnes & Marimow, supra note 8. Ms. Little, who died in 2016,
“had been a popular ﬁxture at a now-shuttered gentlemen’s club in Northeast Washington
and often recruited the club’s dancers to perform at parties she organized.” Id.
37. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S.
Ct. 577 (2018).
38. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003)).
39. Id.
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reaction to the officers’ arrival and subsequent questioning.40 Each is addressed, in turn, below.
1. Condition of the Interior of the House. — The Court found the interior
of the premises in a state that showed what it deemed “few signs of inhabitance.”41 The Court found insufficient the following indicia of habitation:
The house included chairs, a mattress, a refrigerator (stocked with food
and drink) and other large appliances, multiple ﬁxtures, blinds on the
windows, toiletries in the bathrooms, and working electricity and plumbing.42 Justice Thomas, writing for his colleagues in the majority, articulated
what he described as the “common-sense conclusion[]”43 that “[m]ost
homeowners do not live in near-barren houses” of this sort.44
If one assumes that this type of evidence is relevant to the requisite
state of mind for criminal trespass in the District, one could well question
the Court’s conclusion that the weight and quality of this evidence here
provides probable cause. The Justices’ internal standard for what they asserted “most homeowners” would do to furnish and live in their properties
demonstrates a disturbing lack of perspective on the throes of poverty, unemployment, and housing affordability that currently grip so many parts
of the nation, including the locus of the Wesby dispute, which ironically sits
just over three miles to the east of the Justices’ chambers.45 Furniture
expenses are one of the first places the desperately poor look for savings in
especially hard times.46 Moreover, upon entering the house here, the
attendees would have readily observed a number of the very items—lighting,

40. See id. at 586–87.
41. Id. at 586.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231 (1983)).
44. Id.
45. Driving Directions from the Supreme Court of the United States to Fort Dupont, D.C.,
Google Maps, http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/T7VZ-V4NU] (last visited Mar. 10,
2020) (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Supreme Court of
the United States” and search destination field for “Fort Dupont, D.C.”); see also Perry Stein,
As D.C. Families Get Richer, Staggering Disparities Persist, Report Finds, Wash. Post (Apr. 18,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/as-dc-families-get-richer-staggering-disparitiespersist-report-finds/2017/04/17/8fa41700-238a-11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the income disparity that exists between the District’s
wards east of Anacostia and the rest of D.C.).
46. See Tola Mbakwe, Christians Against Poverty Highlights Stats on People Who Don’t
Own Beds, Premier Christian News (June 14, 2017), https://www.premier.org.uk/News/UK/
Christians-Against-Poverty-highlights-stats-on-people-who-don-t-own-beds [https://perma.cc/
FB2X-JEWM]; Sarah Woolley, As Living Costs Rise, Furniture Poverty Grows Behind Closed
Doors, Guardian (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2016/mar/
02/living-costs-rise-furniture-poverty-beds [https://perma.cc/R2U2-UDJ5]; see also Chico
Harlan, Rental America: Why the Poor Pay $4,150 for a $1,500 Sofa, Wash. Post (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/16/she-bought-a-sofa-oninstallment-payments-now-its-straining-her-life/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c61f1d05ee8
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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seating, music, dance space, food, drink, and restrooms—that twentysomething-year-old invitees might hope to find at a party of this nature.
More signiﬁcantly, though, the Court did not justify the assumption
on which the discussion in the preceding paragraphs rests: Why should the
condition of the interior of the house serve as the type of evidence that
indicates that the attendees should have known that their host did not
have authority to invite them in the ﬁrst place?47 The attendees did not
break boards or windows on the house’s exterior to enter.48 Instead, they
were welcomed in through the front door.49 Even if the furniture inside
was sparse, that is unsurprising for newly rented units, particularly those
occupied by the young and poor. Should the attendees have found the
condition of the interior of the house undesirable for a party, they could
have left on arrival (and, indeed, some invitees may have done so and fortuitously avoided being swept up in the mass arrest that followed). But
whether or not individuals ﬁnd the condition of the interior of the house
suitable enough for the purpose for which they received the invitation
does not seem germane to whether those individuals knew or should have
known that their entry was opposed by all lawful occupants.
2. Conduct at the Party. — In terms of the attendees’ conduct at the
party, the Court pointed to the fact that the music was “so loud that it
could be heard outside” past one o’clock in the morning.50 The Court also
noted that select officers varyingly alleged that they smelled marijuana, saw
beer bottles and cups of liquor, and found the ﬂoor unclean.51 Further,
the Court asserted that officers observed some of the attendees reveling in
a “living room [that] had been converted into a makeshift strip club” and
found male guests upstairs with a “naked woman” and a “used condom.”52
If these considerations are relevant to a police officer’s determination
as to whether people should have known that all lawful occupants opposed
their entry, then entrants necessarily must have these same considerations
47. In other words, if the Court’s discussion is understood to concentrate on the weight
of the evidence that is relevant to the requisite state of mind for criminal trespass in the
District, it would seem that the decision has nothing to say about the substantive content of
the underlying criminal trespass offense. If, however, the Court’s discussion is understood—
as this Piece suggests—to concentrate on types of evidence that are relevant to the requisite
state of mind for criminal trespass in the District, the decision can be interpreted to
effectively, if implicitly, alter the substantive content of that underlying offense by adjusting
the state of mind requirement.
48. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 765
F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
49. Id.
50. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–87.
51. Id. at 587. The Court’s reference to marijuana is surprising, given the appellate
court’s assessment: “[T]he arrest report says that Officer Parker recovered marijuana inside
the house, but he acknowledged in his deposition that he smelled—but did not ﬁnd—
marijuana. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that any of the officers observed any
drug-related activity.” Wesby, 765 F.3d at 17 n.1.
52. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 587.
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in mind when they step onto property for which they do not hold title. Yet
the Court did not explain why loud music or the late hour should be considered the type of evidence that would indicate to attendees that they
should have known that their host did not have authority to extend the
party invitation. After all, countless lawful occupants commit noise nuisances or stay up late across the country on a daily basis. If anything, attendees at what they know or should know to be an unauthorized party
might be inclined to keep the decibel level more and more discrete the
later it gets. Likewise, the Court did not explain why people who upon
arrival at a party smell marijuana, detect dirty ﬂoors, observe others drinking alcohol or dancing exotically, or ﬁnd the remnants of protected sex in
a bedroom should immediately leave the home on the thought that all
lawful occupants must have opposed their entry.53 The Court asserted that
“most homeowners do not invite people over” to engage in these types of
activities without acknowledging that some, of course, do.54 The Court’s
silence on these matters seemingly amounts to an implicit moral critique
of what are all legal behaviors, which the opinion buttressed by explicitly
describing the goings-on at the party as “debauchery.”55 The Court drew
on this critique to make the insupportable deduction that, since these
persons were acting immorally, they must have known that their invitation
to the party—their alleged property right—came from an unauthorized
source.
3. Reaction to the Officers’ Arrival and Questioning. — As for the
attendees’ reaction to the officers’ arrival and subsequent questioning, the
Court pointed to evidence indicating that many of the attendees did not
reference Peaches by name when explaining to the police which person
53. The opinion is riddled with conclusory assertions of the following nature: “[T]he
officers could consider the drug use inside the house as evidence that the partygoers knew their
presence was unwelcome.” See id. at 586–87 & n.5; see also Elura Nanos, Justice Thomas Wrote
About Thongs, Strippers and Lap Dances and His Opinion Only Gets Better, Law & Crime
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://lawandcrime.com/uncategorized/justice-thomas-wrote-about-thongsstrippers-and-bras-and-his-opinion-only-gets-better [https://perma.cc/946K-6NDV] (“Justice
Thomas brought a level of pragmatism to this case that’s tough to dispute. When cops come
upon a scene that so clearly indicates likely criminal activity, their suspicion isn’t—and
shouldn’t be—negated just because someone is presenting what might be an innocent
explanation.”). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (No. 15-1485)
(documenting Justice Kagan’s remark that “it just is not obvious that the reasonable partygoer
is supposed to walk into this apartment and say: Got to get out of here.”); Wesby, 765 F.3d at 17
n.1 (explaining that, on the appellate court’s reading of the record, none of the police officers
actually observed any drug-related activity on the premises); see also Richard Re, Fourth
Amendment Fairness, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1409, 1420–21 (2018) (advocating a “perspectival
reorientation” of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from a focus on “whether an
officer is reasonable in performing the search or seizure at issue” to a focus on “whether police
actions are morally acceptable to rights holders”).
54. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–87 & n.5.
55. Id. at 583. See also id. at 588, 591 (describing the attendees as treating the house as
if their host were not a lawful occupant, despite the fact that the attendees did not damage the
property in any way); id. (critiquing the lower court for “brush[ing] aside the drinking and
the lap dances,” despite the fact that drinking and lap dances are undeniably legal activities).
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had invited them to the party.56 It is unsurprising, though, that some
attendees would receive an invitation from Peaches herself and that others
would receive it second hand.57 The Court also referenced one officer’s
testimony that select attendees “scattered” up the stairs when the officers
entered the property.58 Yet while one could imagine a person running upstairs in an attempt to escape a number of charges (e.g., running upstairs
to dispose of illegal narcotics), it seems counterintuitive to suggest that
one who is trying to escape a trespass charge would run up the stairs given
that whether a person is upstairs or downstairs is immaterial to whether
that person committed the crime. Moreover, while evidence of ﬂight can
be considered in deciding whether probable cause exists to make an arrest
when “coupled with speciﬁc knowledge on the part of the officer relating
the suspect to the evidence of crime,”59 longstanding Supreme Court
precedent makes clear that it is “not necessarily indicative of ongoing
criminal activity.”60 Documented disproportionate targeting of racial minorities by police—and every person in attendance at this party was African
American—suggests that ﬂight “might just as easily be motivated by the
desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially proﬁled as by the
desire to hide criminal activity.”61

56. Id. at 583, 587–88.
57. Even accepting as appropriate the unjustiﬁed assumption that select attendees’
failure to identify Peaches by name could be considered among the types of evidence that
are probative of whether those attendees knew or should have known that they were on the
property against the will of all lawful occupants, such a failure, of course, is not relevant to
the attendees who did identify her by name. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 86
(1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.”).
58. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583, 588. This officer’s testimony sat alongside that of others, who
testified that one of the attendees voluntarily opened the door when the officers knocked and
that many others remained seated in the living room upon the officers’ entry. Id. at 583.
59. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67 (1968).
60. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
61. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 340 (Mass. 2016); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Transcript of Keynote Speech, 54 Idaho L. Rev. 287, 290 (2018) (“I grew up
on the south side of Chicago. My guess is a lot of people on the south side of Chicago, and
especially African-American and Latino men, have every reason to go in the other direction
when they see the police.”). Even accepting as appropriate the unjustiﬁed assumption that
scattering up the stairs upon the sight of police officers could be considered among the
types of evidence probative of the claim that select attendees knew or should have known
that they were on the property against the will of all lawful occupants, scattering is not
relevant to the large number of attendees who did not scatter but nonetheless were swept
up in the mass arrest. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583, 588 (describing how select partygoers hid
and scattered into different parts of the house when they saw the police officers); Sibron, 392
U.S. at 62–63 (suggesting that proximity to others who might be engaged in illegal activities
is “simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police
upon an individual’s personal security”).
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Summary: Reallocating Property Rights

Consider a situation in which, assuming all other facts remained unchanged, Peaches hosted this party under the good faith though mistaken
impression that she was a lawful tenant. In such a situation, it seems implausible that a court would consider the condition of the interior of the
house, the attendees’ conduct at the party, select attendees’ racing upstairs
upon the officers’ arrival, or information suggesting that some attendees
received the invitation second hand as evidence that all attendees knew or
should have known that all lawful occupants opposed their entry. It is
unclear why Peaches’s admission to the police that she did not have
authority to host the party suddenly makes those considerations relevant.
For all practical purposes, the Wesby decision abolished the right held
by the general public to access without fear of arrest those properties to
which they reasonably believe they are welcome and the correlative duty
of titleholders (and, in turn, the police) to respect reasonably mistaken
access until the mistake is revealed. It replaced this right–duty pairing with
a strengthened general right of titleholders to exclude others and the correlative duty of the public to avoid making even reasonable mistakes as to
whether their invited entry onto another’s property is actually warranted.
At least until those jurisdictions that have adopted something akin to a
“knew or should have known” mens rea requirement take affirmative steps
to provide clarity on the types of mistakes that fall outside the reach of
their criminal trespass laws, Wesby effectively entitles the police in these
jurisdictions to operate—as a matter of constitutional law—on the assumption that trespassers are more likely than nontrespassers to accept secondhand invitations to attend late-night parties involving loud music, the smell
of marijuana, alcohol consumption, protected sex, and exotic dancing in
lightly furnished homes with dirty ﬂoors.
II. JUSTIFYING REALLOCATION
Property, as an institution socially crafted to beneﬁt the public interest, exists in service of our democratic values. Indeed, it is accountable to
these values. When justiﬁed in maintenance of such accountability, the
state must reallocate property interests as social, economic, and moral
perspectives on the content of these values—and perspectives on what
might harm these values—evolve over time. The prior Part contends that
Wesby effectively generated a reallocation in the sense that it converted a
temporary access interest in reasonably mistaken entrants into a robust
exclusionary interest in titleholders. In this Part, the ﬁrst section portrays
the consequences—the world of distrust—that Wesby’s reallocation, taken
to its logical end, portends. The second section critically evaluates the available justifications, some articulated in the Wesby decision and others left
unsaid, for allowing these consequences to persist.
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A New World of Distrust

In the world Wesby’s de facto reallocation creates, one can most comfortably protect oneself from the threat of criminal arrest only by adhering
to the personal presumption that any person who claims to hold a property
interest—even a close conﬁdant—is deceitful. To eliminate this threat, the
recipient of what reasonably appears to be a valid social invitation seemingly has three options.
One option would be to attempt to acquire formal proof of title. In some
instances, this could involve performing a title search in the hall of records.
In others—including in the many jurisdictions that do not require leaseholds of a year or less to be recorded, such as the District of Columbia—it
likely would require confronting and demanding proof from the alleged
host.
The downsides of this approach are plain enough. To check up on a
friend or a new acquaintance kind enough to invite you to a social engagement may produce distrust on the inviter’s part and the untoward result
of spoiling that relationship. This possibility is especially pronounced in a
situation akin to the circumstances underlying Wesby: Given that all of the
evidence the Court deemed relevant to the attendees’ knowing they were
trespassing only could have been obtained once they arrived at the party,
the attendees would have had to confront the host face-to-face about
whether she really was who she said she was.62 Even if one were somehow
able to verify an inviter’s right to host a social engagement without the
inviter’s knowledge, one nonetheless may feel tormented about having
done so and, in internalizing that torment, materially threaten the
development of a relationship with the inviter.
For these reasons, some recipients will recoil at the thought of questioning the veracity of an inviter’s representation of authority to extend an
invitation. Persons in this position might select an alternative option of declining social invitations outright. This option, too, is rife with ill effects. The
more one declines such invitations, the more one isolates oneself. Mounting
contemporary research suggests that social isolation, in an objective sense—

62. The Wesby record indicates that the responding officers contacted the titleholder
from the scene of the party by phone. However, it does not indicate whether and, if so, how
they confirmed the titleholder’s identity. It seems unlikely that they performed a formal title
check or engaged in any other investigative work to confirm that the person with whom they
were speaking was indeed the titleholder. Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 18 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (“The record does not make clear how Officer
Parker obtained Hughes’s contact information or whether, at the time of the arrests, the police
had made any independent efforts to verify that Hughes was in fact the owner of the house.”).
The Court, though, seemingly expects this type of investigative work from the attendees.
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that is, separate and apart from subjective feelings of loneliness63—has
critical emotional and physiological consequences.64

63. It is possible for someone to be socially isolated and not lonely, just as it is possible
for someone to feel lonely despite myriad social connections. Indeed, numerous studies
have suggested that loneliness and social isolation are not signiﬁcantly correlated. See, e.g.,
Caitlin E. Coyle & Elizabeth Dugan, Social Isolation, Loneliness and Health Among Older
Adults, 24 J. Aging & Health 1346, 1347 (2012); Carla M. Persinotto, Irena Stijacic Cenzer
& Kenneth E. Covinsky, Loneliness in Older Persons: A Predictor of Functional Decline and
Death, 174 Archives Internal Med. 1078, 1078 (2012). For a prominent individual example,
one of the world’s most popular movie stars, Robin Williams, was regularly surrounded by
family, acquaintances, and adoring fans, yet admitted to feeling lonely, and some analysts
attribute Williams’s suicide to his lonely state. See Andrew Solomon, Suicide, A Crime of
Loneliness, New Yorker (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culturalcomment/suicide-crime-loneliness (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
64. On an emotional level, social engagement sits at the heart of well-being. We
fundamentally need others in our lives with whom we have the opportunity to develop
quality reciprocal relations, others on whom we can depend, and, in turn, others who can
depend on us. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo & William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature
and the Need for Social Connection 5–8 (2008) (describing how chronic loneliness and
social isolation disrupt humans’ perceptions, behavior, physiology, and health outcomes).
These relationships give life meaning. It is reaffirming for people to know that they have the
capacity to ﬁnd shared interests, understanding, and joy in circles in which their presence
and contributions are valued. See Dhruv Khullar, How Social Isolation Is Killing Us, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/upshot/how-social-isolationis-killing-us.html [https://perma.cc/9KEP-YKVG]. When the social circles to which one has
access shrink, that person experiences, whether consciously or not, what one physician
terms a “sadness of . . . solitude.” Id.
On a physiological level, researchers have determined that social isolation impairs
immune system functionality; increases inﬂammation (which, in turn, can increase the risk
of many diseases, including heart disease (by twenty-nine percent) and stroke (by thirty-two
percent)); produces higher levels of stress hormones; and elevates blood pressure. Nicole
K. Valtorta, Mona Kanaan, Simon Gilbody, Sara Ronzi & Barbara Hanratty, Loneliness and
Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease and Stroke: Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Observational Studies, 102 BMJ: Heart 1009, 1012–14
(2016); see also, e.g., Bert N. Uchino, Social Support and Health: A Review of Physiological
Processes Potentially Underlying Links to Disease Outcomes, 29 J. Behav. Med. 377, 377–87
(2006) (examining evidence linking social support to changes in cardiovascular, endocrine,
and immune function). These detrimental effects are not conﬁned to the elderly; socially
isolated children have been found to face signiﬁcantly poorer health twenty years later.
Khullar, supra. Recent studies suggest that social isolation leads to an increased mortality
rate that is comparable to and, in some cases exceeds, more commonly and well-accepted
risk factors such as smoking a full pack of cigarettes per day, obesity, and breathing polluted
air. See Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith, Mark Baker, Tyler Harris & David
Stephenson, Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Mortality: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 10 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 227, 235 (2015) (revealing that actual and perceived lack
of social connection is statistically as harmful to human health as common risk factors for
mortality); Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton, Social
Relationships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-Analytic Review, PLOS Med., July 2010, at 1, 14
(associating strong social relationships with a ﬁfty percent reduced risk of early death). To
reiterate a point noted in the text, these studies conclude that people who are socially isolated but genuinely do not feel lonely are at an increased risk of premature death. Moreover,
there is evidence of a “dose-response” effect, such that for each level increase in social isolation there is an attendant increase in the risk of premature mortality. See Yang Claire Yang,
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Those who are disinclined to acquire proof of title but seek to avoid social isolation—whether consciously or not—may pursue a third option: Accept
the invitation at the risk of arrest. Risking arrest is signiﬁcant for a number
of general reasons. Arrests have a tendency to remain on one’s criminal
record for extensive time periods even when the alleged crimes on which
those arrests were based are never prosecuted.65 An arrest record, even for
relatively minor offenses, can make it difficult to ﬁnd employment or
housing, leading to derivative consequences in terms of poverty, hunger,
homelessness, child support, and child custody arrangements.66 An arrest
also, of course, can trigger a review of the arrestee’s immigration status.67

Courtney Boen, Karen Gerken, Ting Li, Kristen Schorpp & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Social
Relationships and Physiological Determinants of Longevity Across the Human Life Span,
113 PNAS 578, 578–83 (2016). As Professor John Cacioppo notes, “For a social species, to
be on the edge of the social perimeter is to be in a dangerous position.” Sanjay Gupta, Why
You Should Treat Loneliness as a Chronic Illness, Everyday Health, https://www.everyday
health.com/news/loneliness-can-really-hurt-you [https://perma.cc/BM28-RC2L] (last updated
Aug. 4, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Cacioppo).
Social engagement also produces very practical, behavioral responses. Socially isolated
persons do not have someone to check on them, take them to the doctor, recognize disease
symptoms, or help them manage stress. See, e.g., Traci Watson, The Dangers of Social
Isolation, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/social-isolation [https://
perma.cc/JX3W-VTXN] (“There are plenty of people who are socially isolated but who are
perfectly happy with that . . . . But even then we should be trying to make sure there’s enough
contacts with them so that if something goes wrong . . . they’re going to be advised and
supported.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrew Steptoe)). Recent studies
also suggest that socially isolated persons are less likely to eat nutritiously, exercise, get adequate
sleep, and take prescribed medications. See, e.g., M. Robbin DiMatteo, Social Support and
Patient Adherence to Medical Treatment: A Meta-Analysis, 23 Health Psychol. 207, 207–14
(2004); M. Robbin DiMatteo, Variations in Patients’ Adherence to Medical Recommendations:
A Quantitative Review of 50 Years of Research, 42 Med. Care 200, 200–08 (2004).
65. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here,
N.Y. Times (May 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-everbeen-arrested-check-here.html [https://perma.cc/377N-45RU].
66. See, e.g., James R. Acker, Reliable Justice: Advancing the Twofold Aim of Establishing
Guilt and Protecting the Innocent, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 719, 728 (2019) (“The arrest decision is
momentous in its own right, and it carries potentially profound implications downstream in
the criminal justice process.”); Picking up the Pieces: A Minneapolis Case Study, ACLU (Apr.
15, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/issues/racial-justice/race-and-criminal-justice/picking-pieces?
redirect=feature/picking-pieces [https://perma.cc/99N2-5DCW] (quoting a state court judge
explaining the cascading effect of a low-level arrest resulting in the arrestee losing his job
for spending the night in jail, leading to a missed paycheck and child support payment, and
the county subsequently holding him in contempt in an effort to encourage payment).
67. See, e.g., Jason G. Idilbi, Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should
North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority?, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1710, 1717
(2008) (describing the process by which a correctional officer can conduct an investigation
into an arrestee’s immigration status if there is a suspicion that the arrestee is undocumented).
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For some, the risk of arrest is signiﬁcant for more speciﬁc reasons:
Namely, the risk of arrest is not distributed equally, particularly across racial lines.68 Analysts have pointed to multiple drivers of racial disparities in
criminal arrest statistics. Contemporary discriminatory motivations play a
role, as do longstanding structural inequalities that can undergird police
departments’ decisions on where to position their officers.69 The discretion
afforded the police in making arrests matters, too, and may be especially
meaningful when low-level crimes like trespassing (and disorderliness,
lurking, spitting, “manner of walking,” etc.) are at stake because these
crimes are victimless and do not result in property damage.70 Yet the extent
to which racialized policing is attributable to certain variables more than
others in a given jurisdiction is of little matter to individual persons of
color who receive a social invitation. The task, in that moment, is to reﬂect
on the reality that, if they accept the invitation, they may well be subjugated
because of the color of their skin.
B.

Potential Justiﬁcations

The preceding section suggests that, in Wesby’s wake, the recipient of what reasonably appears to be a valid social invitation is, for all practical purposes, faced with
68. Though select incidents of racialized policing recently have gained national attention—perhaps most notoriously the unwarranted arrests of two African American men awaiting a business associate at a Philadelphia Starbucks—these incidents merely are symptomatic
of the reality that racial minorities disproportionately are arrested (and convicted and subjected to more stringent sentences) on a routine basis in countless locales nationwide. See,
e.g., Lynda Garcia, ACLU of N.J., Selective Policing: Racially Disparate Enforcement of LowLevel Offenses in New Jersey 18–62 (2015), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/7214/5070/6701/
2015_12_21_aclunj_select_enf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RC4-7RFB] (recounting racially disparate enforcement in the New Jersey cities of Millville, Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Jersey City);
U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department 12–19
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/E5BT-G3SK]
[hereinafter Baltimore Police Investigation] (describing racially disparate enforcement in
Baltimore, Maryland); Thomas Maier & Ann Choi, Unequal Justice, Newsday (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://projects.newsday.com/long-island/unequal-justice-part-1 [https://perma.cc/AEB2-K4
VJ] (recounting racially disparate enforcement on Long Island, New York); Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Commends Grand Rapids Police Decision to End Trespass Policy that Led to
Disproportionate Arrest of African-Americans, ACLU (June 29, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/
news/aclu-commends-grand-rapids-police-decision-end-trespass-policy-led-disproportionate-arrest
[https://perma.cc/265S-9H2Z] (recounting racially disparate enforcement in Grand Rapids,
Michigan). The federal government’s investigation of Baltimore’s policing practices
revealed some particularly horriﬁc anecdotes. In one example, a shift commander’s email to
his subordinates included a template for documenting trespass arrests that pre-filled the race
and gender of the arrestee with the phrase “black male” rather than leaving that space for completion by the arresting officer. Baltimore Police Investigation, supra, at 37.
69. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and TwentyFirst Centuries, 44 Crime & Just. 49, 68 (2015).
70. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1422 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Max Ehrenfreund, The Risks of Walking While Black in Ferguson, Wash. Post (Mar. 4,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/04/95-percent-of-peoplearrested-for-jaywalking-in-ferguson-were-black (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
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the following three options: (a) accept the invitation only on proof of occupancy;
(b) decline the invitation; or (c) accept the invitation without seeking proof of occupancy at the risk of arrest, a risk that is disproportionately distributed. The consequences of a person selecting one of these options—respectively, breeding distrust,
fostering social isolation, and preying on vulnerabilities—are undoubtedly concerning. One must ask: What countervailing interests might be deemed sufficient
to justify putting recipients of social invitations in such a precarious position?
The Wesby Court did not offer an especially clear answer to this inquiry.
Reading between the lines, though, its decision rests on an ineffective combination of economic, privacy, personal responsibility, and pragmatic rationales. On the economic front, placing the onus of a title search—or the
risk of proceeding without one—on a person who receives a social
invitation has only marginal effects in terms of greasing the wheels of voluntary exchanges on the open market. A person who causes no damage to the
premises and, upon learning that entry is unauthorized, is willing to depart
immediately is unlikely to impact the titleholder’s class of potential tenants
in any meaningful way. For the same reasons, the impact on market exchanges seems minimal even if persons lied about the extent to which they
believed their occupation was lawful, for only a very temporary, nontitled
interest is at play here.
In terms of privacy, one must acknowledge that the titleholder in Wesby
did not open his property up to third parties in the same manner that the
titleholder did in the classic criminal trespass case of State v. Shack.71 The
titleholder’s choice in Shack—to commercially farm his land in the way
that he did—resulted in a substantial sacriﬁce of his privacy interest on
certain parts of his land, including within the barracks he built to house
his farmworkers.72 Still, though, the unwitting host in Wesby was an
71. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371 (N.J. 1971).
72. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 Cornell L. Rev.
1063, 1067 (2009) (describing how State v. Shack and its progeny resulted in a standard
whereby the more private property is committed to public use, the more limited the owner’s
right to exclude). The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Marsh v. Alabama that, where a
company effectively owned an entire town, a Jehovah’s Witness’s free speech was assured on
the company’s sidewalks. See 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946); Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited:
Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 633, 664 n.175 (1991). In its ensuing
opinion in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. in 1968, the
Court likened an enclosed shopping mall to the company town in Marsh, thereby protecting
the First Amendment right to peacefully picket within the mall’s “common” spaces. See 391
U.S. 308, 317–19 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Shack
court asserted that some large farms might look precisely like the company town in Marsh
and its equivalent in Logan Valley Plaza but that it was not clear that the farm here necessarily
expressed those characteristics. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 371. To decide the case on Marsh
grounds, then, said the court, would require “an extension of Marsh.” Id. at 371. While
subsequent federal court decisions declined to extend Marsh to open air malls and critiqued
Marsh’s “public function” test by contending that company towns were a relic of the past,
see, e.g., Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 517; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561 (1972), later
compositions of the New Jersey Supreme Court took up Shack’s invitation to apply Marsh’s
logic to myriad circumstances. See, e.g., N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
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absentee owner who was engaged in negotiations with the prospective
tenant who invited the party attendees onto the property.73 While these facts
certainly are not sufficient to make the property unfailingly public, they
support the argument that the unwitting host’s privacy was not implicated
in a significant way. Unlike, perhaps, an owner’s personal interest in a
residence,74 the absentee owner’s interest in a vacant unit is a fungible investment interest.75 In these circumstances, when attendees are willing to
depart at the request of the police without causing any harm to the premises,
the impact on the owner’s investment interest is trivial and, therefore, does
not require accommodation here.
In terms of personal responsibility, titleholders may be of the mind
that recipients of social invitations should take it upon themselves to perform the necessary legwork to decide whether an opportunity presented is
one in which they should take advantage. To nonowners, though, those
privileged to own property do so with the inherent responsibility of keeping
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 780 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing the ability of advocates
against military intervention in the Persian Gulf to distribute antiwar leaﬂets in the common
spaces of shopping malls when those malls had encouraged other nonshopping activities on
their premises in the past); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375–76 (N.J.
1982) (limiting casino’s ability to expel a black jack patron engaged in legally permissible
“card counting” that improved his advantage against the house); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d
615, 623–24, 629 (N.J. 1980) (ﬁnding a state constitutional free speech right to distribute
political leaﬂets on a private university campus in light of the fact that the university had
welcomed abundant public uses of its facilities and resources in an effort to fulﬁll its
educational ideals). While in Community for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’
Ass’n the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a homeowner’s association had not sufficiently
held its community open to the public to subject its lawn sign restrictions to a free speech
challenge, see 929 A.2d 1060, 1073 (N.J. 2007), the general message of the Schmid/Uston/J.M.B.
line of cases survives Twin Rivers wholly intact: “[T]he more private property is devoted to public
use, the more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of the
general public who use that property.” Uston, 445 A.2d at 374 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 629).
73. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 (2018).
74. For contrasting perspectives on the extent to which homeowners establish nonreductive connections to their homes that are more pronounced than connections to other
types of property, compare D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 255, 276–77 (2006) (“The literature on the psychology of home . . . show[s] that homes
are sources of feelings of rootedness, continuity, stability, permanence, and connection to larger
social networks.”), and Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957,
960 (1982) (“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some
constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person should be
accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing.’”), with Stephen Schnably,
Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 347, 364 (1993) (arguing that “people’s involvement with their homes is nowhere
near as simple and uncontroversial as Radin’s presentation suggests”), and Stephanie M.
Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093,
1110 (2009) (arguing that “contrary to claims in the property scholarship, the home is not a
primary construct of self and identity”).
75. Cf. Victoria A. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting
Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 179, 224–26 (1983) (distinguishing between owner occupancy interests and economic investment interests in property).
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the community in which that property rests alive and functioning in a decent
and just order.76 There undoubtedly are social contexts in which perspectives
differ on whether an owner should be considered to have implicitly consented to entry by nonowners. In adverse possession law, for instance, there
is a jurisdictional split as to whether a nonowner’s occupation is presumed
unpermitted by the titleholder when the parties are related to one
another.77 But there also are, in the words of Joseph Singer, some realworld minimum standards that we should be able to “take for granted” in
a modern constitutional democracy.78 For example, there is general agreement that there is no criminal trespass infraction when one enters a store
because the fact that the owner presented the building as a store means
that the property is open to the public.79 Similarly, unless homeowners put
up signs in opposition to solicitation, they implicitly consent to nonowners
knocking on their front doors to attempt to kickstart conversations on any
number of issues, from political candidacies to the sale of cookies.80 The
suggestion that people should be wary of entering a private home to which
they have been invited seems wholly inconsistent with these norms; indeed,
it calls into question the continuing viability of implicit consent in any context at all.
The unconvincing nature of the economic, privacy, and personal responsibility rationales suggests that a sparsely veiled pragmatic preference
toward protecting local police departments from ﬁscally ruinous damage
awards in civil rights cases most likely steered the Court to its conclusion.81
Yet assuming that this interest is a legitimate one, it seems that several
methods of serving that interest may have been available that did not involve reallocating property rights in a manner that authorizes the police to
arrest people in places where they reasonably trusted in others that they were
76. See Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 1215,
1220–21 (2017) (critiquing conceptions of property that lack “an outward-regarding perspective that encompasses a broader sense of responsibility for the impacts of property use on
society and nature, and that recognizes the role of collective action in managing the exercise of
property rights”).
77. Compare Totman v. Malloy, 725 N.E.2d 1045, 1047–48 (Mass. 2000) (expressly
declining to create a presumption that family membership between claimants to property
renders prior use of that property permissive), with Petch v. Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 261
(Neb. 1983) (“[A]s between parties sustaining parental and ﬁlial relationships, the possession of land of one by the other is presumed to be permissive, not adverse.”).
78. Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum
Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 139, 150 (2008).
79. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Avila, Food Lion and Beyond: New Developments in the Law
of Hidden Cameras, Comm. Law., Winter 1999, at 1, 21.
80. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145–49 (1943) (concluding that
door-to-door canvassers’ speech interests and residents’ interests in receiving information
outweigh community interests in preventing crime and protecting against annoyance).
81. The District’s appellate court had upheld a trial court judgment of $680,000 in
compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 585 (2018).
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permitted to be. For instance, the Court could have lowered the damage
award or considered other remedies, such as an injunction, police training, or police discipline (including though not limited to suspension or separation of certain officers from the police force). Alternatively, it could have
excused these specific officers from a suit for damages on qualified immunity grounds on the view that the statutory or constitutional unlawfulness
of their conduct was not “clearly established at the time” they acted at the
scene of this party.82 Such a course would have served the interest of protecting police departments from damage awards while treating neither set
of actors—the attendees nor the police officers—as having done something
wrong. Overturning the damages award on qualified immunity grounds
would not critique the attendees for trusting that their inviters had authority
to extend the party invitation; the Court would have had to conclude only
that, in these “unique” circumstances,83 the police officers were not “plainly
incompetent”84 or “knowingly violat[ing] the law”85 when making the arrests
on the belief that the attendees were not telling the truth about their invitations. A holding concentrating on immunity would have spared the Court
from having to address the probable cause question—and, thus, the property interest allocation question—at all.86
C.

Summary: Justifying Reallocation

Post-Wesby, in those jurisdictions that subject to criminal trespass liability
those persons who “knew or should have known” that their entry was unwanted by all lawful occupants, the recipient of what reasonably appears to
be a valid social invitation has the option of (a) accepting the invitation only
on proof of occupancy; (b) declining the invitation; or (c) accepting the invitation without proof of occupancy at the risk of arrest, a risk that is shared
disproportionately by marginalized communities. The economic, privacy,

82. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (“Qualiﬁed immunity shields
government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”).
83. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (recognizing that the “unique” facts
and circumstances at hand indicated that the defendant officer’s conduct “did not violate clearly
established law”).
84. See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).
85. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
86. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg each wrote separately to declare that they would
have decided the case exclusively on these grounds. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 593 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 593–94 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part). Justice Thomas’s opinion for
the Court addressed both the probable cause and qualified immunity issues. This Piece does
not take a normative position on the substance of current Supreme Court doctrine surrounding
qualified immunity but, instead, only notes that this doctrine provided a pathway for the
Court to resolve Wesby in favor of the police in a manner that did not result in a de facto
reallocation of property interests. For a concise recent summary of the scholarly commentary on qualiﬁed immunity, see Crocker, supra note 8, at 1415–21.
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personal responsibility, and pragmatic justiﬁcations for allowing these consequences to persist are, when subjected to critical evaluation, wholly unpersuasive. The decision denigrates what Rainer Forst calls the “basic right
to justification” as to why we should operate under the assumption that other
human beings are devious when they extend a social hand.87
CONCLUSION: WESBY AND DISTRUST
Property law and criminal law are more intertwined than an initial glance
might suggest. Property, as a social institution, requires that the state make
allocative choices in the face of competing access and exclusionary claims
to ﬁnite resources. For crimes involving theft of, intrusion onto, or interference with resources, these allocative choices establish the elements of the
offense. Decades ago, the District of Columbia enacted a criminal trespass
law that allocated property rights in the following manner: The general
public held a right to access without fear of arrest those properties to which
they reasonably believed they were welcome; in turn, titleholders held the
correlative duty to respect reasonably mistaken access until the mistake is
revealed.88
In specifying the rights and duties of separate individuals who come into
conflict with one another, this allocative choice helps to deﬁne the types of
relationships that constitute us as necessarily intertwined social beings on
equal terms.89 It assumes that people have the right to have guests, the right
to be guests on the property of others, and the right to trust others when
they lead us to believe that they have a property right to extend an invitation. Requiring the state to demonstrate that entrants knew or should have
known through some explicit or implicit objective manifestation that their
entry was unwanted by all lawful occupants minimizes the risk that
individuals would avoid availing themselves of associational opportunities
out of fear that their conclusion that they are welcome onto another’s
property, though reasonable under the circumstances, proves in error.90

87. See Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of
Justice 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012).
88. Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining how earlier
appellate court decisions had interpreted the District’s criminal trespass ordinance to require
that the state produce evidence disproving entrants’ contentions that they “had a reasonable
bona fide belief in [their] right to enter” to garner a conviction).
89. In Jennifer Nedelsky’s words, the liberal tradition of associating individualism with
rights is “not so much wrong as seriously and dangerously one-sided in its emphasis.” Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, 13 (1993).
90. Drawing on John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” reasoning, see John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 136–42 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009) (1971), the District’s course reflects consideration of
how one would want the criminal law to treat a nineteen-year-old child had the child attended
a party on the good faith belief that the inviter had the authority to extend the invitation, when
it ultimately turned out that this inviter had not yet formalized a lease, had overstayed a lease,
or otherwise did not hold a sufficient interest in the property to host that party.
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This Piece suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wesby operates to replace this right–duty pairing with a strengthened general right of
titleholders to exclude others and the correlative duty of the public to avoid
making even reasonable mistakes as to whether their invited entry onto another’s property actually is warranted. The consequences of this de facto reallocation are not trivial. Post-Wesby, recipients of invitations face the choice
of formally conﬁrming their host’s occupancy rights, which breeds
distrust; accepting invitations without such conﬁrmation at the risk of
arrest, which preys on vulnerabilities; or denying those invitations outright,
which fosters social isolation. The economic, privacy, personal responsibility,
and pragmatic rationales for withstanding these disturbing consequences—
which disproportionately will be borne by traditionally marginalized
populations—are thin on their face and, in the final analysis, unconvincing.
It will be incumbent on state and local governments to recognize the
existence and impact of Wesby’s latent reallocation of property interests
and, to the extent they are able within Wesby’s cramped conﬁnes, consider
taking affirmative steps to reinstitute the prior allocation.
If there is a silver lining to Wesby, it may lie in its signaling that trust is
an oft-concealed but keenly important value with which we must engage
when reﬂecting on the various options facing state entities as they decide
how to allocate property interests. Indeed, when framed in their full
complexity, there are a vast number of disputes over resources or interests
from all corners of property law—including, for instance, rules on receiving stolen goods,91 disclosing hidden defects in residential sales,92 distributing assets upon divorce or separation,93 and acquiring land by adverse
possession94 or estoppel95—in which one available choice allows a property
claimant to violate trust that a competing claimant has placed in another
person. Resolving these disputes, therefore, requires that the state decide
whether it will establish an atmosphere that promotes trust or, in the
pursuit of competing interests, one in which we must regularly question
91. See, e.g., Jones v. Mitchell, 816 So. 2d 68, 72 (Ala. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing
circumstances in which an innocent purchaser of stolen property may retain possession in the
face of a claim by the person from whom the property had been stolen).
92. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (suggesting that a seller
should not benefit from a sale reaped solely through failing to disclose a known defect not
readily discoverable by the buyer, for allowing so would instruct sellers that they can disregard
a buyer’s trust in entering the marketplace of residential sales in good faith).
93. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313–15 (Wis. 1987) (recognizing the possibility of imposing a constructive trust on property accumulated throughout a relationship
between unmarried partners to avoid unjust enrichment upon that relationship’s dissolution).
94. See, e.g., Reeves v. Metro. Tr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 2, 3–4 (Ark. 1973) (awarding ownership of a parcel to claimants who possessed the parcel on the good faith—if mistaken—belief
that they owned it, while declining to award ownership of a second parcel about which the
claimants conceded they knew did not belong to them).
95. See, e.g., Burns v. McCormick, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (N.Y. 1922) (addressing a situation in which the claimants did not secure in writing prior to a family member’s passing the
alleged promise from this family member that he would provide for them upon his death in
exchange for their caring for him in his inﬁrmity).
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the motivations of others. In this sense, perhaps this Piece’s critical
evaluation of Wesby can serve as the foundation point for future explorations of the latent yet intimate connection between property—in and
among all of its many forms—and trust.

